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BEYOND THE SOLDIER: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” 
JOHN EVERIDGE BARRETT 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Before there was a United States of America, there was an American military.  
During the Revolution, when the nation had yet to win its independence, General George 
Washington and his Continental Army were, for all intents and purposes, the nation.  The 
issue of homosexuals serving in the American military goes back at least that far; and 
even then, the military did not know quite what to do with the gay Soldiers serving in its 
ranks.  For example, General Frederich von Steuben, a French officer who had come to 
America to train its young Army, was openly gay.
1
  In spite of this he commanded a 
division at Valley Forge, served as the first Inspector General of the Army, and wrote the 
first drill and ceremony manual for the Army.
2
  He is remembered in history as a hero of 
the Revolutionary War and is still invoked by the modern United States military.
3
   
 But the American military has always been of two minds when it comes to the 
idea of homosexuals serving within its ranks.  At the same time and in the same army that 
Gen. von Steuben was charged with molding into a competent fighting force, Lieutenant 
Gotthold Frederick Enslin was discharged for engaging in same-sex sexual relations.
4
  
Despite the lack of any codified ban on either gays serving or engaging in such same-sex 
conduct such discharge “‘with Abborrance and Detestation of such Infamous Crimes’”5 
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should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the history behind and enforcement of 
the United States military’s modern policy on gay and lesbian service members, “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell.”   
As a political compromise born out of an effort at reform that was opposed by 
supporters of more traditional ideas
6
, the statute was a success (it ensured, as such 
compromises often do, that neither side got what it really wanted), at least in the short 
term.  However, despite its deceptively simple name, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has 
become a complicated issue for the gay and lesbian community, its political allies (and 
enemies), the military itself, and the nation as a whole.  This paper is the attempt by one 
veteran (Captain, Ordnance Corps, U.S. Army, 2003-2008, Operations Iraqi Freedom I 
and V) to examine the impact of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the seventeen years since its 
inception.  This paper will not focus on the impact of the policy on gay and lesbian 
service members as individuals; this most personal and tragic aspect of the policy has 
been examined from many perspectives, and those looking for such an analysis will find 
an especially well-reasoned and poignant article by Daniel Ryan Koslosky entitled Sexual 
Identity as Personhood: Towards an Expressive Liberty in the Military Context extremely 
helpful.
7
   
Instead, this paper will focus on several of the less-examined (but just as 
important) areas impacted by the policy.  Part II provides a brief background of the 
policy.  Part III examines the substance of the policy, looking at not only the terms of the 
policy but also how it is actually applied in the military.  Part IV examines arguments in 
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support of the policy.  Part V examines the policy’s impact on different-sex families in 
the military, and goes beyond discussions of monetary compensation to those less-
tangible, but equally (if not more) important communal and social benefits.  Part VI 
examines the impact of the policy on the military itself, including the most important 
(and possibly only) justification: that allowing gay and lesbian service members to serve 
openly will negatively impact morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion to the 
extent that it affects the military’s ability to complete its mission.  Part VII examines the 
impact that the policy has had on the nation as a whole.  Finally, Part VIII considers how 
the military and the nation should move forward, especially in light of the 
administration’s renewed support for ending the policy and allowing gays and lesbians to 
serve openly.   
 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE POLICY 
 Throughout most of American history there was no ban on homosexuals serving 
in the military.  The first criminalization of sodomy under military law did not occur until 
the passage of the Articles of War of 1916.
8
  This regulation only criminalized conduct, 
however; the first administrative prohibition on gays and lesbians serving in the military 
did not appear until World War II.
9
  From then until 1993 homosexuality itself provided 
sufficient cause for discharge from the service. 
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 During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton made ending the 
ban on gays and lesbians serving in the military a part of his platform.
10
  After his 
inauguration, President Clinton immediately ordered the Secretary of Defense to design 
an executive order ending the ban on gays and lesbians.
11
  Despite the administration’s 
pledge to end the ban, and perhaps as a result of the public opposition to that position 
expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the resulting order represented a compromise, 
where gays and lesbians could serve in the military, but homosexual conduct would still 
be grounds for discharge.
12
  Simultaneously, Congress was considering two separate bills 
in response to the President’s pledge.13  The bill that was eventually enacted into law 
embodied the compromise of the executive order, and became the law popularly known 
as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”14  Contrary to the spirit of compromise intended by the 
President, the new law “turned out to be a ban on gays in the military disguised as a 
liberalization of the government’s stance on gays in the military.”15 
 
III. SUBSTANCE OF THE POLICY 
 Ten U.S.C. § 654, “Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces,” 
provides that a service member will be separated from the military if one or more of the 
following findings is made: the service member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, 
or solicited another to engage in homosexual acts;
16
 the service member has stated he or 
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 5 
she is a homosexual or bisexual;
17
 the service member has married or attempted to marry 
a person of the same sex.
18
  Under the statute, a service member who has made a 
statement that he or she is gay, lesbian, or bisexual can be retained if the service member 
can show he or she has no propensity to engage in same-sex acts.
19
   
The Department of Defense (DOD) developed the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy 
to comply with the requirements of the statute enacted by Congress.
20
  This policy 
features four major components: “Don’t Ask,” “Don’t Tell,” “Don’t Pursue,” and “Don’t 
Harass.”21  “Don’t Ask” prohibits commanders or investigating officers from asking 
service members about their sexual orientation.
22
  On its face, this component allows gay 
and lesbian service members to serve in the military without the fear of being forced into 
making self-incriminating statements that can lead to their discharge.  In fact, while free 
from official interrogation into their sexual orientation, gay and lesbian service members 
often find themselves in a difficult position when asked personal questions by their 
fellow service members.  Such questions, even when asked innocently, can force service 
members to choose between lying to their comrades or making potentially damaging 
statements that, while not necessarily sufficient to warrant a discharge, can often lead to 
an official investigation.
23
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The Policy’s “Don’t Tell” component puts gay and lesbian service members on 
notice that disclosing their sexual orientation will provide grounds for discharge.
24
  Such 
disclosure can take the form of “homosexual acts, a statement…that demonstrates a 
propensity to engage in homosexual acts, or a homosexual marriage or attempted 
marriage.”25  There are some exceptions to this, such as security clearance interviews 
(statements of sexual orientation not a basis for discharge) and privileged statements in 
the context of the attorney-client relationship.
26
  However, the majority of statements, 
even those made to health care providers and chaplains, can be used in a discharge.
27
 
The policy’s “Don’t Pursue” component defines “when it is appropriate to 
conduct an investigation and what the scope of a legitimate investigation may include.”28  
DOD guidelines state that a legitimate investigation may only be initiated and conducted 
by a service member’s commanding officer, and only when the commander has credible 
information that there is a basis for discharge.
29
  According to the DOD, credible 
information does not exist when accusations are based on opinion, rumor, or associational 
activity (such as reading gay literature, going to a gay bar, or associating with gays or 
lesbians).
30
  Rather, credible information can only be based on first-hand knowledge of 
the prohibited conduct.
31
  While “Don’t Pursue” is designed to protect service members 
from unjustified investigations, commonly known as “witch hunts,” the complex system 
of directives and instructions created to express this component makes it difficult for 
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installation Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers to understand and apply “Don’t 
Pursue,” and renders it nearly incomprehensible to commanding officers.32   
While serving as a company commander on two different Army installations
33
 I 
experienced the confusion surrounding “Don’t Pursue” firsthand.  Upon taking command 
at both installations, I contacted the JAG officer assigned to assist commanders in my 
battalion.  In each location I received different guidance across the board: what 
constituted credible information, what an investigation could cover, even what role JAG 
would play in any investigation (little to none).  Additionally, at neither post was there a 
coherent policy (that I was made aware of) at the division level, or even at the brigade 
level; discretion to create a policy was left to battalion commanders.  Of the two battalion 
commanders I answered to while in command, one had no concrete policy: his only 
guidance was that the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy would be enforced, but that 
company commanders were free to use there own discretion.  The effect of this was that 
the policy was not enforced in the battalion while I was there.   
My second battalion commander made his policy much more clear: while not 
going so far as to speak negatively of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” he made sure his company 
commanders knew there was no room for discrimination of any kind in his battalion, and 
that while company commanders had the authority to open and pursue an investigation, 
he believed such investigations placed a greater strain on unit morale than the gay or 
lesbian service members they were designed to remove.  Accordingly, he required any 
commander opening such an investigation to provide him a Memorandum For Record 
explaining, with specificity, what harm the allegedly homosexual Soldier was causing to 
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the unit, and why an investigation leading to discharge was the only available course of 
action (though not required by the Policy, such a requirement is within the discretionary 
authority of a battalion commander).  As with my first battalion commander (but for very 
different reasons) the result was that the policy was not enforced.  Conversely, I was 
aware that other battalions on both posts had very different policies, and that openly gay 
and lesbian Soldiers were not welcome in those units.  Thus, at both the JAG and 
command levels, I experienced no unifying guidance on how to approach, never mind 
enforce, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.  This lack of clear guidance alone was 
enough to make me, and my fellow company commanders, disinterested in enforcing the 
policy; we had to choose our battles, and we decided our energies and authority was 
better directed elsewhere.   
The final component, “Don’t Harass,” was designed to protect service members 
from harassment based on their sexual orientation; it also instructed commanders not to 
investigate service members who had complained of anti-gay harassment.
34
  The 
Department of Defense also adopted its Anti-Harassment Action Plan, designed to 
increase training on and awareness of anti-harassment directives aimed at protecting 
homosexuals.
35
  Unfortunately, in my experience and the experience of my Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Basic Course (OBC) classmates, this Plan 
was not widely disseminated to the lower levels of the Army’s leadership structure.  As a 
Platoon Leader and later Company Commander, I attended many mandatory training 
sessions with my Soldiers in both Germany and Ft. Riley that covered everything from 
drunk driving to sexual harassment; in none of those training sessions was the “Don’t 
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Ask, Don’t Tell” policy ever discussed, beyond general briefings on tolerance.  There 
was never mention of an Anti-Harassment Action Plan (which I had never heard of until I 
began research for this paper).  While other posts or services may have seen broader 
dissemination of the Plan, it is clear that implementation of anti-harassment directives 
designed to protect gay and lesbian service members has been sporadic at best, and 
virtually non-existent at worst.   
 
IV. IN DEFENSE OF THE POLICY 
 For many people the story of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” epitomizes the political 
process: an attempt to use the Federal government as an engine to drive positive social 
change (or, on the other side, to try to fix something that wasn’t broken) that ended up as 
a political compromise that satisfied no one.  However, democratic government 
necessitates compromise, and there are several arguments positing that “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” strikes a necessary balance while, at least on its face, acting as a step in the 
right direction.   
 The first argument in defense of the policy is that it has made it possible for gays 
and lesbians to legally serve in the armed forces, and has actually improved the condition 
of their service in several ways.  Most obviously is “the elimination of any questions 
related to the sexual orientation of those applying for or entering the armed forces.”36  
The elimination of this preliminary bar to military service is, on its face, a victory for 
gays and lesbians: serving in the military (and thereby defending the nation) is an 
important civic responsibility, one not all citizens are fit for.  Ending the categorical 
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prohibition on such service by homosexuals sends the message that gays and lesbians, in 
general, are no less able to bear that responsibility than the members of any other 
particular group currently permitted to do so.  While the policy is not what President 
Clinton promised, and by its very nature does not permit gays and lesbians to serve 
openly, it is nevertheless a step in the right direction, in that it is a first step towards the 
end of the Federal government’s implicit (and in this case, explicit) marginalization of 
gays and lesbians.   
 Another argument in favor of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is that it has protected gay 
and lesbian service members while they served.  The policy’s “Don’t Pursue” component 
was designed to end the harassment of and witch hunts for homosexuals in the military.
37
  
The Department of Defense’s Instruction on investigations into homosexual conduct is 
intended to provide a framework for commanders that allow them to enforce the policy 
while simultaneously restricting them with certain guidelines, such as the requirement of 
credible information, and what may and may not qualify as such.
38
  Such restrictions are 
designed to eliminate efforts to expose a service member’s alleged homosexual 
orientation, and then find actionable homosexual conduct in the wake of that revelation.
39
  
In this regard the policy has largely been successful, as witch hunts have decreased (but 
not disappeared) throughout the services.
40
   
Again, while “Don’t Pursue” is not an ideal solution it has, as with the “Don’t 
Ask” component, provided gay and lesbian service members a benefit they did not 
possess before.  Before the policy was implemented, homosexual service members were 
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completely at the mercy of their individual commanders: while many served with 
distinction and even served openly, they did so only with at least tacit permission from 
their commanders.
41
  Even this was a risk: a change of command could bring a new 
person unwilling to tolerate homosexuals in his or her unit, and then a service member’s 
open homosexuality would suddenly become grounds for discharge.  Under “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” gay and lesbian service members are protected from such arbitrary 
enforcement: they no longer need fear that a change of command or reassignment to 
another unit will result in an investigation that will lead to discharge.   
Of course, this is because under the policy, gay and lesbian service members may 
not serve openly; if they are in compliance with “Don’t Tell,” the service members 
ostensibly need not fear such change because neither a new commander nor a new unit 
will know they are homosexual.  While it is true that the policy protects gay and lesbian 
service members from arbitrary enforcement, it also denies the possibility of those 
service members from serving openly, as some did before the ban.
42
  Additionally, I have 
personally served in units where gay and lesbian Soldiers served with varying degrees of 
openness, from just out of the closet to having their partner listed on the unit’s informal 
contact roster.  Thus, the reality of life in the services (or at least in the Army) for gay 
and lesbian service members seems to have come full circle, with their ability to serve 
openly to any degree dependant on their individual commanders’ tolerance for 
homosexuals.   
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V. IMPACT ON THE FAMILY 
 As a young lieutenant leading a platoon of Soldiers in a foreign country, I quickly 
learned that in addition to taking care of my Soldiers, one of my most important duties 
would be to take care of their families as well.  Today’s military puts a premium on not 
only its service members, but also on their spouses, children and other family members, 
collectively referred to in the military as dependants.
43
  Unfortunately, the military’s 
support of families is not universal: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” severely affects the families 
of gay and lesbian service members by making any attempt to have a family life similar 
to their heterosexual comrades difficult to impossible.   
 The families of gay and lesbian service members, like those of straight service 
members, can take many shapes.  They can be single parent homes, or they can live with 
a partner.  They can have children, whether biologically from previous marriages, or 
through adoption; or they can be childless.  Whatever their composition, they all have one 
thing in common with different-sex families: all dependants are enrolled in the Defense 
Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS).
44
  DEERS is used by the Department 
of Defense to ensure that family members receive the benefits they are entitled to; the 
nature of DEERS’s centralized, service-wide database becomes especially important 
during a deployment, when a service member will not be available to confirm that family 
members are in fact dependants, and therefore eligible for benefits.  The nature of the 
problem facing same-sex families is immediately evident: while a heterosexual service 
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member will not think twice before enrolling his wife upon joining (or getting married)
45
, 
a gay or lesbian service member enrolling his or her same-sex partner in DEERS runs the 
risk that such action will be questioned, investigated, and considered a “statement… that 
demonstrates a propensity to engage in homosexual acts” in violation of the policy.46  
This quandary becomes even more unfortunate when the full spectrum of benefits 
available to military families is considered.   
 All service members and their dependants are entitled to full medical care, 
including general health, dental, optical and chiropractic, through the military’s health 
care program.
47
  Most of this care, especially for service members serving outside the 
continental United States (i.e. Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, etc.), is directly 
provided by the military at military medical facilities.
48
  To receive these medical benefits 
(and any medical care outside the United States) dependants must be enrolled in 
DEERS.
49
  For this reason the partners of many gay and lesbian service members have no 
access to the medical care that their different-sex counterparts enjoy. 
 Service members who are married or have children (or are of a sufficiently senior 
rank) may generally choose to either live on post while receiving an allowance for 
dependants, or to live off post and receive a housing allowance to cover some of their 
costs (along with the dependant allowance).
50
  Especially for junior enlisted service 
members, the additional allowances can account for a large percentage of their monthly 
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take-home pay, and help defray the costs of supporting children and a dependant 
partner.
51
  Again, to be eligible for these additional payments, service members must 
enroll their dependants in DEERS.  This prevents many gay and lesbian service members 
from applying for and receiving the same compensation as their heterosexual comrades, 
and creates a burden that falls heaviest on those least able to bear it.   
 Related to this problem is the more fundamental dilemma of children themselves: 
namely, how to actually have children in a same-sex family in the military.  Gay and 
lesbian parents of children who are living with a partner while serving face many 
obstacles; all children (whether biological or adopted) must be enrolled in DEERS, and 
the failure to do so may be punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ).
52
  If the parent’s partner is not enrolled as the child’s other parent, the partner 
will have no authority over or interests in the child within the realm of the military’s 
jurisdiction.  If the child is adopted by the partner, official adoption papers could be 
considered a statement under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”53   
 A similar problem emerges when a service member is deployed to a combat zone.  
Service members with minor children must, without exception, develop and present a 
family care plan to their commanding officer.
54
  This plan must detail who will care for 
the child(ren) while the service member is deployed, how the service member will 
finance the care, how logistical support will be provided and where the child(ren) will 
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live, and include detailed information on the care provider.
55
  Failure to provide such a 
plan can be punishable by administrative action or, if the deficiency is not corrected, 
involuntary separation from the service.
56
  A gay or lesbian parent with children who 
wanted their partner to be the caregiver for their children while they were deployed is 
thus faced with the same dilemma: list their partner as the primary care provider and risk 
having their mandatory family care plan be used as a statement within the meaning of 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” or choose to list someone else as the primary care provider for 
their children.  For those same-sex families without extended family to help them this 
dilemma can prove especially cruel, forcing some gay and lesbian service members to 
choose between their families and their careers in a way straight service members never 
have to.   
 The burden on same-sex families runs deeper than lacking the financial benefits 
provided by the military to its families.  Families are the backbone of the armed forces: 
they provide service members the emotional and psychological support they need to 
survive long deployments in today’s non-linear warzones.  The military, in turn, has 
developed many programs and institutions to provide support to the families left behind 
when service members go to war.   
 Nowhere is the military’s support of families more apparent and necessary than 
for service members in overseas duty stations.  My first posting was to a unit near 
Frankfurt, Germany.  When I arrived, my unit was already deployed to Iraq, and I spent 
several months with the Rear Detachment before joining them downrange.  At the same 
time I was becoming familiar with the services the military provides for its overseas 
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personnel, I was learning how important those services were to the families of deployed 
Soldiers.  In Germany, only single officers lived off-post; all other personnel lived on 
small bases scattered around the country.  These bases provided almost everything an 
American could want: supermarkets that sold American food; a Post Exchange that sold 
American clothes, electronics, appliances and media; laundry and dry cleaning services; 
movie theaters; post offices; travel agencies; recreational spots for bowling and roller 
skating; American fast food restaurants; car dealerships selling Ford and Chevrolet; 
American barber shops and hair salons; even service stations selling gas at American 
prices.  The largest posts were like small cities, with their own malls, food courts, 
hospitals, emergency services and neighborhoods.  Even the smallest communities had 
schools, parks, community centers and clubs.  For American service members and their 
families, these communities were slices of home, transported to a foreign country.  For 
the younger Soldiers and their spouses, often just out of high school, they were an 
antidote to homesickness: a place where everyone spoke English, and they could belong.   
 Families stationed overseas often take such services and opportunities for granted; 
for same-sex families however, such necessities are difficult, if not impossible, to enjoy.  
Access to U.S. military installations is restricted to ID card holders; once inside some 
activities, such as shopping at the supermarket or Post Exchange, require an ID card.  For 
dependants to receive ID cards they must be enrolled in DEERS; this puts same-sex 
families in the same quandary examined above.  In order to benefit from the same 
privileges different-sex families enjoy, they must risk taking action that could be 
construed as a statement under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”57   
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Not all the assistance provided to families is so tangible.  Family Readiness 
Groups (FRGs) are gatherings where all the family members in a company are invited to 
come and share food, ideas, and tips and to receive news from a central point.  They 
voice their concerns and complaints to the spouse of a senior officer, usually the 
commander’s wife or husband.  The spouse then relays those concerns and messages to 
the commander, ensuring senior officers are kept aware of the conditions of the families 
back home.  Often the groups provide an outlet for frustrated spouses to blow off steam 
and an opportunity for older spouses to watch for warnings signs, such as a young spouse 
with a young child who is having trouble.  These groups are an invaluable resource for 
families, binding them together and to the unit during the most difficult times.  Their 
function is especially important overseas, where FRGs often take the place of extended 
families that would otherwise provide emotional and moral support.   
 For same-sex families who have come together while the service member is 
stationed in the United States, the burden is heaviest when the service member is 
transferred to an overseas duty station.  In the States same-sex families can work around 
many of the difficulties: they can live off post, have off-post access to virtually all 
services the military provides overseas, and often have extended family able to help 
them.  When this same-sex family moves overseas, all these advantages disappear: the 
family is almost totally reliant on the military and the institutions and support programs it 
provides.  For this reason, and because military communities are almost always smaller 
and more closely knit overseas, same-sex families are particularly vulnerable to an 
overseas tour.  Partners cannot participate in the formal moving process, because the 
necessary procedures to get them classified as dependants can be used as statements 
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against the service member.
58
  While nothing prevents them from buying a plane ticket to 
their service member’s destination, partners who make the trip are faced with living by 
themselves in a foreign country (unless their service member is permitted to live off 
post), unable to freely enjoy that slice of home that other military families have come to 
depend on.  Though they may gain access to the physical facilities through their partner, 
they cannot participate in the community itself: the family activities, the formal events, 
the unit parties, and everything else that draws the Soldiers and families of a unit together 
without risking discovery and the investigation that may follow.  Perhaps most important, 
they may be unwilling or unable to join their unit’s Family Readiness Group; without the 
support of the group, they will be alone when their partner deploys.  Military life is 
stressful enough on families, especially during deployments.  Take away the programs 
and institutions designed to relieve that stress, and add the active exclusion of (and 
implicit moral judgment against) same-sex partners and the military becomes a very 
difficult place for same-sex families to exist.   
 
VI. IMPACT ON THE MILITARY 
 Strongly connected to the negative impact the policy has on individual service 
members and their families is an effect that has become clearer over the past few years: 
the negative impact “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has on the military itself.  Publicized by 
high profile stories in newspapers across the country and increasingly referred to by high-
ranking military officers themselves, it is likely this factor more than any single other that 
has led to the current drive to repeal the policy.   
                                                 
58
 Id.   
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 The statute on which “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is based was the result of 
Congressional policymaking designed to head off a possible executive order lifting the 
ban on homosexuals serving in the military.
59
  Congress received support from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, whose uncharacteristically public opposition to repeal stemmed at least in 
part from the traditional doctrine that gays and lesbians in the military would undermine 
morale and unit cohesion.
60
  Perhaps predictably, Congress made several findings that it 
codified in the resulting statute, including “[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons 
who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an 
unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit 
cohesion that are the essence of military capability.”61  From the beginning then, the 
rationale for “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has been the perceived need to keep openly gay and 
lesbian service members out of the military or risk the erosion of the qualities which 
comprise the military’s fighting capability.   
 Seventeen years later, there is evidence that not only does such a need not exist 
but that the opposite may be true: discharging otherwise qualified service members 
because they are openly gay or lesbian, and the resulting atmosphere created within the 
military, may actually harm morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion.
62
  One 
source for this new perspective is the Federal government itself.  The Department of 
Defense’s Office of the Inspector General (IG) commissioned a report to examine the 
extent to which anti-homosexual remarks and harassment was prevalent and tolerated 
                                                 
59
 Eugene R. Milhizer, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: A Qualified Defense, 21 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 349, 355 
(2004). 
60
 Alexander, supra note 6, at 408.   
61
 10 U.S.C. § 654 (a) (15) (2000).   
62
 Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 89 
Iowa L. Rev. 1633, 1681 (2004).   
 20 
within the armed forces.
63
  The inquiry was prompted by concerns of the Secretary of 
Defense that “disparaging speech or expression with respect to sexual orientation ... can 
undermine good order and discipline.”64  The IG surveyed multiple installations from all 
the services and discovered that “offensive comments about homosexuals were 
commonplace and a majority believed they were tolerated to some extent.”65  In addition, 
seventy-three percent of respondents who stated that a senior person witnessed the 
harassment reported that the senior person did nothing to stop the harassment.
66
  Of 
respondents who described witnessing a specific instance of harassment, sixty-one 
percent stated the incident occurred on a military installation or ship, and just under fifty 
percent that the harassment occurred while on duty.
67
   
Though the IG drew no substantive conclusions from the data gathered, for such 
harassment to occur while on duty and in the presence of seniors and go uncorrected 
speaks volumes about how far the climate in such units has deteriorated.  No unit can 
experience the harassment of one group of people that is effectively sanctioned by 
leadership and not be affected in some way; any such unit where homosexual service 
members are harassed so openly will suffer morale and discipline problems, as 
leadership’s failure to address the harassment emboldens those responsible.  If such 
harassment continues or even escalates, any sense of esprit de corps will be lost, resulting 
in impaired capability to complete the mission.   
                                                 
63
 Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Evaluation Report on the Military 
Environment With Respect to the Homosexual Conduct Policy 1, 1 (2000).   
64
 Id. at 7.   
65
 Id. at 24.   
66
 Id.   
67
 Id.   
 21 
The military’s long-held position that gays and lesbians serving openly would 
undermine morale and unit cohesion is undercut by its own practices.  If the military’s 
contention were true, it should be possible to see an increase in the number of discharges 
of homosexual service members during times of war: to retain such ‘disruptive’ personnel 
when units were going into combat would be logically inconsistent with the universally 
acknowledged need to deploy units at peak military fitness.   
In fact, for all the inconsistencies of enforcement of the ban on homosexuals 
(whether pre- or post-“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”) there is one unifying factor: a decrease in 
the discharging of gay and lesbian service members during wartime.
68
  During every 
conflict from World War II on, the military has consistently relaxed its enforcement of 
(the contemporary incarnation of) the ban on gays and lesbians.
69
  Since the opening of 
the Global War On Terrorism after September 11, 2001, homosexual discharges have 
decreased every year.
70
  This trend reached its peak in 2009, when such discharges were 
roughly one-quarter of their number in 2001, the last year the United States was not at 
war.
71
  To loosen the restrictions on a group of people who are supposedly a disruption to 
their unit just when unit cohesion matters most is a clear logical inconsistency: either unit 
cohesion does not really matter (it does), or homosexuals are not the disruptive influence 
the military claims.  Such practice at the very least “calls into question the rationales 
asserted for banning lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons from the military.”72   
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The policy has also hurt the military in very specific ways.  In 2002 and 2003, 
with the United States preparing for the invasion of Iraq, thirty-seven linguists were 
discharged from the Defense Language Institute under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”73  Many 
of these linguists were trained in Arabic, and would have likely played critical roles in the 
invasion and subsequent counter-insurgency.
74
  The story was circulated in the national 
media, resulting in widespread outrage from people and politicians (on both sides of the 
isle) that renewed debate on the ban.
75
  The military looked foolish and decreased its 
readiness at the same time, while enforcing a policy that would see its enforcement 
decrease as the decade (and two wars) wore on.
76
  But these counter-productive 
discharges have not been limited to translators: nearly 800 service members with critical 
skills have been dismissed under the policy.
77
  The drain of such critical personnel can 
only have negative consequences for the readiness of the military.   
There is evidence that gays and lesbians can serve openly in a modern army 
without negatively impacting readiness and unit cohesion.  Twenty-four nations now 
permit gays and lesbians to serve openly.
78
  The case of the United Kingdom is especially 
enlightening.  In several different cases, members and former members of the British 
military sued the British government, claiming the military’s investigations into their 
private lives, pursuant to its ban on homosexuals, violated their rights as outlined in the 
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European Convention on Human Rights.
79
  The case came before the European Court on 
Human Rights,
80
 where the United Kingdom claimed its policy was necessary because 
the presence of homosexuals had a “substantial, negative impact on morale, fighting 
power, and operational effectiveness.”81  The Court found this argument rested “‘solely 
upon the negative attitudes of heterosexual personnel towards those of homosexual 
orientation.’”82  The Court also noted that the work performance of the service members 
was never the subject of doubt within the Ministry of Defense.
83
   
In addition to the United Kingdom, the examples of Canada, Australia, and Israel 
are informative.  Like the United Kingdom and the United States, they are representative 
democracies that had previously banned gays and lesbians from serving in their 
militaries.
84
  Like the United Kingdom, all three countries reversed their bans.
85
  In all 
four countries there were numerous studies conducted that attempted to discern any 
decrease in readiness, morale or unit cohesion after the ban on homosexuals was lifted.
86
  
All the studies agreed that there was there was no reduction in readiness, and that 
repealing the ban did not adversely affect morale or unit cohesion.
87
  In fact, they found 
the opposite: repealing the ban resulted in a reduction of harassment, decreased anxiety 
about gays and lesbians in the ranks, and greater openness between gay and lesbian and 
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heterosexual service members.
88
  In addition, since The Netherlands first lifted its ban on 
gays and lesbians serving in 1974, no study of any of the twenty-three nations to follow 
suit has shown a decrease in performance attributed to lifting the ban.
89
 
The evidence from these militaries is both powerful and relevant.  Most of these 
countries are allies of the United States, and have deployed troops to Afghanistan or Iraq 
in support of U.S. operations.  Their post-ban militaries have been tested by conflicts 
around the world, with no evidence of any decrease in performance.
90
  It is clear that the 
militaries of our allies have not suffered from allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly.  
Supporters of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in America often point out that as the world’s only 
superpower the United States must meet obligations and maintain capabilities that our 
allies need not.  While this is undoubtedly true, “the question is not how similar our 
missions are to those of other nations but whether the United States is any less capable 
than other nations of integrating gays into its military.”91  Having served in her armed 
forces and alongside the armed forces of our allies, and led her young men and women, I 
can answer that question with certainty: if it is true that an organization is only as good as 
its people, the United States military is capable of accomplishing any mission given it, 
including the integration of openly gay and lesbian service members into its ranks.   
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VII. IMPACT ON THE NATION 
 There is a final aspect of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” that must be mentioned: its 
negative impact on the nation.  The histories of America and its military are inextricably 
intertwined: during the Revolution, George Washington had to forge an army before he 
could build a nation.  When the nation was torn apart by the Civil War, it was the military 
and its commander-in-chief that held it together.  Afterwards, the Army led the country’s 
expansion westward while the Navy gained it prestige and respect abroad.  Today 
America’s military continues to represent a wide spectrum of America, accepting citizens 
(and non-citizens) of all backgrounds who want to serve the cause of freedom, with one 
glaring exception: gays and lesbians.  In a past dominated by different attitudes and 
mores, this might not have mattered.  Today, while the rest of the country is slowly 
shifting to a position of equality for gays and lesbians in many areas, the military is in 
danger of becoming culturally isolated from the nation it defends.   
 There are several ways in which “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is negatively impacting 
the nation.  The most immediate is the judicial branch’s policy of deference to the 
military.
92
  On occasion, the Supreme Court has declined to find that the military violated 
portions of the Constitution in circumstances where, had the incident occurred within the 
context of a different government agency, the Court might otherwise find such a 
violation.
93
  Such deference did not begin with the policy
94
: in Parker v. Levy, the 
Supreme Court stated that “military society has been a society apart from civilian 
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society.”95  In that case, the Court used the separate military justice system “to endorse a 
view of the entire military as an institution apart from, and not a part of, the society it 
protects.”96  In Goldman v. Weinberger the Court ultimately held, with respect to 
regulations relating to discipline, that the “desirability of [such] regulations in the 
military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and they are under no 
constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment.”97  According 
to Justice Brennan in dissent, if the military is willing to assert that disciplinary needs 
require restriction of constitutional rights, “it seems the Court will accept that conclusion, 
no matter how absurd or unsupported it is.”98   
 Judicial deference has the potential to damage civilian-military relations by 
threatening civilian control of the military.  For the civilian government to work properly, 
all three branches must fully perform their constitutional role.  Through its deference, the 
judiciary has emphasized the importance of Congressional authority to regulate the 
military.  Ironically, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” provides a special challenge for legislators: 
the policy prevents those affected by it (gays and lesbian service members) from raising 
concerns about it or even identifying themselves to their elected representatives while 
they are still serving on active duty or in the Guard or Reserves.  Politicians cannot 
properly monitor a government policy without information about the policy’s 
workability, effectiveness, costs and benefits.
99
  Deprived of first-hand information of the 
effect of the policy on those it regulates, and without proper statistical data about the 
policy (impossible to get without “asking” and requiring service members to “tell”) 
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policy makers in the legislative branch cannot get an accurate picture of the reality of the 
policy’s effect.  If information is power, the enforced silence of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
reduces the military’s accountability to the legislature, thereby reducing civilian control 
of the military.   
 Finally, and perhaps of greatest concern, is the growing cultural disconnect 
between the military and the rest of the nation.
100
  Throughout its history the United 
States military has been seen as an honorable profession for America’s young people.  
Appointments to the nation’s military academies were sought after by the best and 
brightest, and it was not unusual to for young men to join after graduating from an Ivy 
League university.  Today, the picture is far different: the military’s policy on 
homosexuals stands in stark contrast to the nation’s universities, virtually all of which 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
101
  In these universities, the 
nation’s future leaders see gay and lesbian students open about who they are, and 
involved in all facets of college life; in the military, they see only people forced to hide 
who they are from the very institution they have volunteered to serve in.  In defending 
and enforcing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” the military has created the image of an institution 
that these young people cannot relate to: they find it “alien, unwelcoming, and, for many, 
morally wrong.”102  The result is that Ivy League universities now send less than one 
percent of their graduates to the military.
103
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While in the short term this deprives the military of skilled leaders, in the longer 
term the ramifications for civil society are much greater: the possibility that many of the 
nation’s future leaders will not only have never served in defense of their country, but 
will have seen the conditions of such service as incompatible with their personal beliefs.  
Such a result could have disastrous consequences for the nation as a whole.  While 
repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” will not, of course, completely bridge the gap between 
military and civil society, a military that allows gays and lesbians to serve openly will 
more closely reflect both the nation’s values of equality and liberty and the changing 
mores of a society that is, slowly but surely, accepting gays and lesbians as equal 
members.   
 
VIII. MOVING FORWARD 
 For the first time in 2008, the Democratic National Party included a repeal of 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” on its platform.104  President Obama, a supporter of repeal, 
reemphasized his desire to see the end of the policy during his 2010 State of the Union 
address.
105
  This turnabout in the executive branch, when coupled with an increase in the 
already existing base of support in both houses of Congress and the reality of the 
manpower requirements of two wars (and, for the cynical reader, an upcoming midterm 
election), make it increasingly possible that 2010 will be the last year gay and lesbian 
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service members are discharged under the policy.
106
  The question of how repeal will be 
accomplished is shifting from an academic exercise to something more immediate.   
In the wake of Lawrence v. Texas,
107
 several cases have raised the question of the 
continued constitutionality of the policy
108
.  In Cook v. Gates
109
 twelve service members 
separated under the policy challenged the constitutionality of 10 U.S.C. § 654.   Despite 
believing that the Lawrence holding was based on “a standard of review that lies between 
strict scrutiny and rational basis”110 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
Cook rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments of due process,111 equal protection,112 and 
freedom of speech.
113
  In Witt v. Department of the Air Force
114
 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted a similar case, with somewhat different results.  
Though the Ninth Circuit rejected Major Witt’s equal protection argument,115 the court 
applied a heightened scrutiny test
116
 to her substantive due process claim and remanded 
to the district court to develop the record on that claim.
117
  While it is unclear what the 
ultimate result of this case will be, or how far its holding will resonate (for example, the 
First Circuit in Cook declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s heightened scrutiny test118), it 
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seems clear that judicial deference to the military means that any action will likely come 
from either the executive or the legislative branches.   
President Obama’s campaign rhetoric and recent reaffirmation of his desire to 
repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” would seem to indicate the executive branch will lead the 
way in any effort to end the policy.  In fact, this many not happen as many advocates 
hope: given President Clinton’s experience attempting to unilaterally end the ban on 
homosexuals, without the support of either the military or Congress, it is likely President 
Obama will first attempt to build a consensus within Congress.
119
  As with his 
Afghanistan strategy, Obama will also probably ensure he has the support of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff before actively backing any proposal.
120
  However, this does not mean the 
President’s only option is to wait for a bill from Congress. 
 As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, President Obama has the authority 
to order the Department of Defense to issue new guidelines on the enforcement of “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell.”121  In addition, the statute gives the Secretary of Defense the authority 
to develop regulations necessary to implement the policy.
122
  These sources of authority 
give the President the ability to change some of the conditions of how the policy is 
enforced.  The executive’s first step should be to prevent service members from being 
discharged based on statements made to doctors, psychologists, and chaplains.
123
  The 
lack of confidentiality for gay and lesbian service members with these care providers can 
create a barrier for them to seek help out of fear that statements they have made during 
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treatment will be used against them during a discharge.
124
  With many service members 
facing the stress of multiple combat deployments and stories of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder filling the news, the military should be actively encouraging its returning 
service members to receive treatment, not maintaining barriers that keep some of them 
away. 
 The second step should be to clarify the DOD’s current guidelines on what 
qualifies as “credible information” and a “reliable source.”  Such information should only 
be admissible in an investigation if it comes from another service member, not a 
civilian.
125
  The policy’s stated goal is to protect morale and unit cohesion; if a civilian 
with no connection to the unit acquires knowledge of a service member’s violation(s) of 
the policy, such knowledge should be irrelevant to the course of an investigation, as it 
would have no bearing on morale and unit cohesion.  The most recent example of this 
was Air Force Sergeant Jene Newsome, who was serving in South Dakota and had 
married her partner in Iowa.  When civilian police went to her home to arrest her spouse, 
they found a copy of her marriage certificate and informed the military.  Sgt. Newsome 
was discharged under the policy.
126
  There was no evidence that either Sgt. Newsome’s 
sexual orientation or her marriage to a woman was either known or had any negative 
affect on the morale or cohesion of her unit.  Such a discharge of a service member 
otherwise performing her duties and having no negative impact on her unit only 
underscores the need for better guidance from the DOD.   
 In addition, the executive branch should take steps to ensure that such “credible 
information” is only presented by a “reliable source.”  To do this, the DOD should 
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require that any service member making an allegation go on record by submitting a sworn 
statement that they witnessed the conduct or statement prohibited by the policy.
127
  This 
requirement could be used to ensure that commanders pursuing an investigation actually 
have “credible information” before any discharge proceedings.  It would also discourage 
those who would use the policy as a tool for personal reasons, such as personal animus.   
 There is a final alteration the DOD could make to its guidance on the policy.  
Earlier I described how my Battalion Commander required any Company Commander 
who was going to conduct an investigation into a violation of the policy to submit to him 
a Memorandum for Record detailing why such an investigation was necessary; 
specifically, how the allegedly homosexual Soldier was hurting morale or unit 
cohesion.
128
  This requirement served to discourage any such investigations.  However, it 
also left the door open to investigate any genuine impact on morale or unit cohesion 
created by a violation of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  Perhaps unsurprisingly, no such 
investigation occurred.  However, the basic concept could be used by the military at 
large: commanders pursuing an investigation could be required to make a showing that 
the service member’s homosexual conduct “substantially interfered with unit 
cohesion.”129   
A showing that the service member’s discharge is least disruptive way to solve 
the problem could also be required.
130
  Such a change would have several benefits.  It 
would allow commanders who feel obligated to pursue such an investigation but who are 
reluctant to discharge one of their own people to take lesser steps, such as dispensing 
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non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the UCMJ.
131
  It would discourage 
commanders from pursuing such an investigation for personal reasons by providing a 
burden of proof the commander would have to demonstrate to superior officers.  Finally, 
such a change would leave open the possibility of discharge for any service member 
whose homosexual conduct could be shown to have actually adversely affected the 
morale or cohesion of his or her unit.  Again, as this is the most proffered justification for 
the policy, it would be hard for supporters of the policy to object to any change that 
explicitly retained such a scenario.   
These are changes that would be relatively easy for the executive branch to 
implement: the Department of Defense would have to issue a new Instruction updating its 
regulations on the policy, and would have to train commanders and JAG officers on the 
new regulations and their implementation.  Nothing new for the rest of the force: 
everyone else would continue to play by the widely known (if not widely understood) 
existing rules of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  Now, as the Secretary of Defense has 
announced an easing of the policy,
132
 Congress is stepping up consideration of its own 
options.   
After years of vacillation on the subject, it now seems possible that Congress will 
reverse its own law of seventeen years and end “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  In 2005 a bi-
partisan group of members of the House of Representatives introduced the Military 
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Readiness Enhancement Act.
133
  The Act would repeal the current policy and replace it 
with a policy of non-discrimination with respect to sexual orientation in the armed 
forces.
134
  The Act adds sexual orientation to the military’s Equal Opportunity mandate 
and requires regulations on military personnel to be applied without regard to sexual 
orientation.
135
  After years without similar legislation, the Senate now has its own version 
of the bill that would allow gays and lesbians to openly serve in the military.
136
   
Of course, nothing is certain in Congressional politics; but the two pillars most 
often used by supporters to prop up the policy are both weakening.  The first is the 
presumption that openly gay and lesbian service members will adversely affect unit 
cohesion and morale; this has been dealt with here, exposed as little more than personal 
opinion based ignorance and bias.  The second and last bastion that supporters of the 
policy have clung to has been opposition within the military itself.  It was the unexpected 
public opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that helped derail President Clinton’s 
attempt to lift the ban in 1993.
137
  It was to preserve the military’s ability to enjoy 
unfettered exercise of its professional judgment about its own policies that caused the 
judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, to give great deference to the military.
138
   
However, even this last pillar of support for the policy may be cracking.  Both the 
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have called for a 
repeal of the law.
139
  The DOD has begun a comprehensive review of the issue that 
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should be complete around 1 December 2010.
140
  Indeed, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen, stated he was “troubled by the fact that we have in place a 
policy which forces young men and women to lie about who they are in order to defend 
their fellow citizens.”141  He added that it was his personal belief that “allowing gays and 
lesbians to serve openly would be the right thing to do.”142  Much may depend on the 
results of the DOD’s in-house study of how to implement any change in the policy,143 but 
if the military itself concludes that gays and lesbians can serve openly without hurting the 
mission, the fate of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” may finally be sealed.   
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was conceived as a political compromise and received by 
gays and lesbians as a victory that replaced a total ban with a policy that allowed them to 
serve in the military.  As victories go, this must be one of the most pyrrhic in American 
history.  For the right to serve their country without (nominally) fear of discharge because 
of their sexual orientation, gay and lesbian service members, their families, the military, 
and indeed, the entire nation have paid, and continue to pay, a heavy price.   
And yet, despite the litany of harms “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has wrought, as a 
Soldier and a veteran of two combat deployments, I might still support the policy if I 
believed there was any evidence for, or truth to, its ultimate justification: that allowing 
gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military would result in sufficient harm to 
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morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion to adversely impact the ability of the 
military to carry out its missions.  There is no such evidence.  The United States military 
is the greatest fighting force the world has ever seen; on the battlefield it has defeated 
some of the greatest enemies of freedom in history.  Abroad, it has been the single 
greatest force behind the expansion of freedom and democracy since 1941.  At home, it 
successfully integrated minorities into its ranks before those groups achieved similar 
equality in civil society.  The belief that this same military would be derailed by allowing 
gays and lesbians to serve openly is no longer defensible; it is doubtful it ever was.   
Indeed, such a belief is an insult to the brave men and women, past and present, of 
every background, who have defended their country and the cause of freedom.  That 
belief, without evidence to support it, and now with ample evidence to refute it, is 
exposed for what it is: simple prejudice.  Its premise is astonishing when finally laid bare: 
service members, the majority of whom are heterosexual, cannot or will not tolerate gays 
and lesbians serving openly alongside them.  Good order and discipline will crumble, and 
morale and unit cohesion will collapse in a frenzy of anti-homosexual hatred, harassment 
and violence.  To someone who has served in the military, it is almost incomprehensible 
that anyone could actually believe this.  The truth is, despite a very mixed record with 
some genuinely ugly incidents, time and again service members have accepted and 
embraced both their closeted and openly gay and lesbian comrades-in-arms.  In fact, from 
public schools to universities, from various blue-collar jobs to graduate school, the 
military has been the most diverse and accepting institution I have ever been a part of, 
with a breadth of diverse people, views and experiences that puts the highest ivory tower 
law school to shame.   
 37 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is one of the last policies of overt discrimination in the 
nation that defined freedom and equality for the modern world.  Despite this 
discrimination, countless gay and lesbian Americans have risked humiliation and 
harassment to defend, and when necessary, to die for their country.  We will likely never 
know their true number, where they served, or where they died.  But we can honor all of 
them, known and unknown, by giving them something greater than any monument or 
memorial: we can honor their service by repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’ Tell” and replacing 
it with a policy that allows all qualified Americans to share in the responsibility of 
defending their country and the ideals on which it is built.  Indeed, such an act would 
honor not just the many gay and lesbian service members who have sacrificed so much 
for America; it would honor all service members and veterans, living and dead.  It would 
show us that, underneath the politics of fear and hatred, the America that we fought for, 
the land of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” is still alive and well.   
